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Costs, margins and competition 
Causes of structural change in retailing 
Bart NOOTEBOOM * 
The paper analyses causes of structural change in retailing 
in terms of productivity and profit. The analysis of productiv- 
ity  focuses on  economies  of  scale,  and  briefly  considers  the 
effects  of  an  extension  of  shopping  hours.  The  analysis  of 
profits considers the factors that determine average margin per 
type of trade. The results are used to explain trends of increas- 
ing scale, concentration and declining share of independents. 
1. Introduction 
In  many countries we have witnessed  the 
following phenomena in  retailing:  increasing 
scale  of  shops,  decreasing density of  shops, 
increasing concentration, and declining share 
of independents. For a descriptive account of 
these phenomena in several countries, see the 
contribution by Nooteboom, Thurik and Vol- 
lebregt in the present issue. 
Underlying causes  of  these  developments 
occur  on  both  the  demand  and  the  supply 
side.  Factors  on  the  demand  side  are  rela- 
tively well  known.  There  are  factors  associ- 
ated with a higher standard of living. One of 
these  is  consumers'  greater  mobility  (car 
ownership),  which  allows  for  a  greater  dis- 
tance and a  lower density of shops.  Another 
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factor  is  the  increasing  confidence  in  and 
familiarity with  a  widening range  of  goods, 
due to both a higher level of education and an 
increased volume and frequency of purchases, 
which allows for less service and private labels 
of multiples. This familiarity with products is 
enhanced  by  opportunities  for  mass  adver- 
tising  through the  media.  Scarcity of time 1, 
the rising proportion of women working out- 
side  the  home,  and  more ample  means  and 
opportunities  for  recreation  have  yielded  a 
preference for efficient shopping (self-service, 
one-stop-shopping),  with  large  volumes  of 
purchases  per  shopping  trip,  made  possible 
by increased ownership of cars, refrigerators, 
freezers and other facilities for home storage. 
Since those causes on the demand side are 
fairly well known, the present paper will not 
discuss  them  in  any  detail.  Causes  on  the 
supply  side  are  not  all  widely known,  and 
some  of  them  are  controversial.  Two  con- 
troversial issues are price discrimination (' un- 
fair' discounts from suppliers) and the effects 
of longer trading hours. The paper will briefly 
touch upon both issues.  Research at  the Re- 
search Institute for Small and Medium Sized 
Business in the Netherlands yields insight into 
causes  associated  with  productivity, particu- 
larly  economies of  scale  in  store  operation, 
and with the determination of retail margins. 
The  present  paper  will  focus  on  those  less 
well known causes of structural change. 
First the issue of productivity is discussed, 
in  particular,  differences in  productivity be- 
tween small and large shops of the same type. 
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1  Recently,  of  course,  there  have  been  growing  numbers  of 
unemployed people,  for whom time is  not  scarce,  but who 
have less money to spend. 
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Implications  for  productivity  of  extended 
shopping  hours  are  considered  briefly.  Next 
the  determinants  of  profits  are  considered: 
How  are profit  margins  affected by produc- 
tivity,  scale,  type  of  trade,  competition  and 
the  business  cycle.  In  the  final  section  the 
analysis of productivity and profit is  used in 
an  attempt  to  explain  the  phenomena  of 
structural  change in  retailing  in  general  and 
the food trade in particular. 
2. Productivity 
Unlike  a  factory,  a  retail  unit  does  not 
physically produce a  product, but provides a 
facility which consumers may decide to utilize. 
The causation involved is different. In retail- 
ing  the initiative  for  the use  of capacity lies 
on the side of the consumer, while in industry 
it  lies  on  the  side  of  the producer.  Industry 
provides a  utility of form, while retailing pro- 
vides  a  utility  of time and  place.  In  view of 
those differences, one should not  too readily 
and  uncritically  employ  concepts  and  tools 
from studies of productivity in industry. The 
traditional  concept of a  production  function 
in economic theory is of dubious relevance in 
retailing. It is true that the establishment of a 
shop  attracts  consumers  and,  in  that  sense, 
can be said  to generate sales with the means 
of capital (shopping space and inventory) and 
labour  (for service or cashing).  But  one may 
also, and perhaps more relevantly, view retail- 
ing as adjusting capacity to a flow of demand. 
Taking  the  latter  approach,  Nooteboom 
(1980:ch.  3,  1982)  developed a  theory of re- 
tailing  costs  based  on  the  theory of queues. 
Given a  certain pattern of consumer arrivals, 
and the time needed to serve customers (which 
depends  on  the  volume  of  purchases  per 
customer and  the  technology and  quality  of 
the service),  how much labour  is  required  to 
prevent waiting times on the part of customers 
that  exceed  the  target,  consistent  with  the 
service  level  chosen  as  part  of  the  retailing 
mix? 
Queuing  theory  was  developed  to  answer 
this type of question. Of course, the intensity 
of customer arrivals varies during the day, the 
week  and  the  year.  That  is  where part-time 
labour  comes  in  to  adjust  capacity  to  de- 
mand.  The relationship  between capacity (in 
terms of labour and shop space) and sales size 
per  shop  of  a  given  type,  i.e.,  with  a  given 
retailing mix,  was  determined and  proved  to 
be approximated by a  simple straight line, as 
illustrated in fig. 1. 
This  linear  cost  curve  has  a  threshold 
volume,  i.e.,  a  certain  minimum  which  ob- 
capacity  •  •  •  •  • 
COSTS  •  •  •  •  • 
•  •  •  •  •  •  4 
thresh°rc  f  capacity 
Fig.  1.  Linear cost curve. 
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tains  even  if  sales  are  zero.  In  the  case  of 
labour,  the  threshold  is  equal  to  the  annual 
opening time of the shop, if we are consider- 
ing costs on  an  annual  basis.  In  the Nether- 
lands  the legal  maximum of opening time is 
52  hours per week, which per annum,  allow- 
ing  for  holidays,  yields  about  2,500  hours. 
When  we  estimate  the  cost  curve  for  the 
Netherlands  for different types  of trade,  the 
threshold is  consistently estimated  at  or just 
below  this  volume,  which  corroborates  the 
underlying  theory.  In  other  countries  with 
longer opening  times,  one  expects  and  finds 
higher threshold values. The threshold applies 
if there is only a line of check-outs or a single 
service  desk  or  counter.  If  there  are  more 
service  units  spread  around  the  shop,  the 
threshold must be multiplied accordingly. This 
also  is  confirmed  in  empirical  tests  of  the 
theory (cf. Nooteboom, (1980,  1987)).  Actual 
data are always scattered around the straight 
line, as illustrated in fig. 1. Partly, this scatter 
is  explained  by  the  theory,  on  the  basis  of 
differences  in  the  use  of  part-time  labour, 
quality of labour,  costs  of labour,  volume of 
purchases per customer, service level, location 
and  use  of  technology  (type  and  extent  of 
automation,  for  example)  (cf.  Nooteboom 
(1980,  1987)  and Thurik (1984a)).  To the ex- 
tent that the shops considered are more simi- 
lar  in  those  respects,  the  scatter  around  the 
curve is  less.  The  model has  been  estimated 
and validated on data  from the Netherlands, 
Germany,  France,  UK,  USA,  Canada  and 
South  Africa  (cf.  Nooteboom  (1980,  1987) 
and  Thurik  (1984a)).  For  shop  size,  the 
threshold  (for  a  single  service  unit)  is  esti- 
mated at about 50 m 2.  = 
The  linear  cost  curve  implies  a  consider- 
able  economy  of  scale  at  the  lower  end  of 
shop size. For small shops the threshold costs 
weigh much more heavily than for large shops 
of  the  same  type.  Labour  productivity,  de- 
fined  as  sales  per  hour  of  labour,  increases 
with shop size in the way illustrated in fig. 2. 
Studies  of  gross  margins  for  shops  of  the 
same type show that percentage gross margin 
does not systematically depend on sales  size. 
In  other words,  while  for smaller shops  per- 
centage  costs  are  higher  (due  to  threshold 
costs), percentage margin is not. If percentage 
margin  is  not  size  dependent,  the  relation 
between gross profit and sales size is a straight 
line without intercept. The confrontation be- 
tween gross profit and costs,  to  arrive at  net 
profit  as  a  function  of  size,  thus  is  as  il- 
lustrated in fig. 3.  Due to threshold costs, net 
2  In better climates than in  the Netherlands, with opportuni- 
ties for queuing outside the cover of the shop, the threshold 
may be lower. 
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Fig.  3.  Net profits and size. 
profit  is  positive  only  beyond  some  critical 
sales size. 
3. Trading hours 
Since  the  labour  threshold  equals  opening 
time (for each department  or service point in 
the  shop),  an  extension  of opening  time  will 
increase  the  threshold,  thus  shifting  the  cost 
curve upwards.  If percentage  margin  remains 
the same, critical  sales size will then  increase, 
as illustrated  in  fig.  4.  3 To  express it  differ- 
ently,  an  extension  of opening  time yields an 
increase of costs which in percentage  terms is 
greater for smaller shops. 
The conclusion is as follows: If the number 
of  hours  that  shops  are  actually  open  in- 
creases,  and  if there is no increase  or shift of 
sales in favour of small  shops,  there will be a 
further  impulse  toward  an  increase  of  scale 
and decline of small  shops. 
A  more  favorable effect for  smaller  shops 
would arise if an extension of shopping hours 
were  to  lead  to  a  shift  of  sales  to  smaller 
shops.  This may be the case for shops on the 
3  Nooteboom (1983). 
neighborhood  level,  due  to  a  shift  to  the 
market  segment  of  purchases  by  women 
working outside the home and  single workers 
outside  regular  business  hours.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  trend  towards  reduced  working 
times may weaken that effect. The increase of 
sales  required  to  offset  increased  threshold 
costs is  a  fixed amount,  independent  of sales 
size.  4  Thus  the  percentage  increase  of  sales 
required is larger for smaller shops. 
Of course,  it  is not logically necessarily so 
that  a  permitted  extension  of shopping hours 
will  lead  to  actual  lengthening  of  opening 
time.  It might  lead to a  shift of opening  time 
to  different  hours  without  an  extension  of 
total opening time.  However, retailers  tend to 
feel obliged by competitive pressure to extend 
hours  when that  is allowed.  Evidence for this 
is found in the fact that average opening time 
is observed to be longer when allowed 5 
In  view  of  these  considerations,  policy 
thinking  in  the  Netherlands  is  inclined  to go 
in  the  direction  of  maintenance  of  a  maxi- 
4  If the formula of the cost curve is c -  d  + eq, where c =  costs, 
d  =  threshold costs,  q =  sales size, and  m  =  percentage gross 
margin,  then  the  increase  of  sales  required  to  offset  an 
increase of threshold costs  D  equals  D/(m  -  e). 
5  Cf.  Nooteboom (1982) and Thurik (1984b). B. Nooteboom /  Costs, margins and competition  237 
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mum  opening  time  (at  52  hours  per  week), 
but with a  certain amount of liberalization of 
the selection of opening times. 
An important  question is  also whether for 
opening hours outside normal business hours 
labour can be obtained  cheaply or only at  a 
higher cost.  This  depends on regulations and 
agreements concerning wages and  conditions 
of  labour.  On  the  whole,  Western  European 
countries have fewer opportunities for obtain- 
ing cheap,  flexible, non-standard labour than 
the  US,  so  that  opportunities  for  changing 
opening  hours  without  or  with  limited  cost 
increases are less. 
Independents are at  an advantage here,  to 
the  extent  that  they  can  bring  in  informal 
labour  of  their  spouses,  children  or  other 
family  members  during  nonstandard  hours. 
(Of course,  this  is  likely to  detract  from the 
liberty, leisure time and social contacts of the 
family,  and  may  affect  the  homework  and 
hence the education of the children.) Cultural 
developments  in  developed  countries,  with 
emancipation  of women and  children  and  a 
reduction of paternal authority, have reduced 
opportunities  in  this  respect.  Important  ex- 
ceptions  are  ethnic  minorities  where  family 
discipline  and  patriarchal  rule  are often still 
strong. 
4. Profits 
When  percentage  margins  are  compared 
between  shops  of  different  size  but  of  the 
same  type  (same  product/service  mix),  no 
systematic relation with shop  size is  found 6 
This  implies  that  special  discounts  to  larger 
shops,  to  the extent that  they occur, tend to 
be  passed  on  to  the  consumer.  This  is  con- 
sistent with the conclusion of the report of a 
recent  inquiry  into  the  possibility  of  price 
discrimination in  the U.K. 7 The report con- 
cludes that there are indeed special discounts 
to larger retailers, but that this does not matter 
since they are passed on to the consumer. But 
the  point  is,  of  course,  that  this  offers  the 
larger buyers an extra means to  extend  their 
market share, and yields a  further increase of 
concentration,  which  further  increases  the 
buying power of the biggest companies. 
6  Cf.  Nooteboom (1980: 67-68). 
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A  study of the factors that determine aver- 
age percentage gross margin per type of trade 
is  offered in  Nooteboom (1980,  ch.  8,  1985). 
The model developed in  the  study claims  to 
explain  both  differences  in  average  per- 
centage  margin  between  different  types  of 
trade,  and  the development in  time per  type 
of trade. The model was tested and estimated 
on  Dutch and German data.  In Nooteboom, 
Thurik  and  Vollebregt  (1985)  the  model  is 
applied also to other countries, in a  compari- 
son  of  margins  between  different  European 
countries.  Per  type  of  trade,  the  model  ex- 
plains  average  percentage gross  margin  as  a 
mark-up  on  average  percentage  operating 
costs  excluding  a  reward  for  shopkeepers' 
labour.  The  height  of  the  mark-up  is  ex- 
plained by the following factors: 
-  Average shop  size:  the average percentage 
mark-up is inversely related to average sales 
size per shop. The rationale of this compo- 
nent of the model is that at a  higher aver- 
age sales size a  lower percentage of sales is 
required to achieve a  given amount of mo- 
ney as  a  reward  for  shopkeepers'  labour. 
Estimation  of  the  model  implies  an  esti- 
mate  of  the  average  reward  available  for 
shopkeepers'  labour.  It  turns  out  to  be 
about  equal,  in  the  Netherlands,  to  the 
legal minimum wage for employees. This is 
the average reward; shops of above average 
size  yield  a  reward  which  is  propor- 
tionately higher and  shops  of below  aver- 
age size a  reward which is proportionately 
less. 
-  Type of product and  service level:  a  more 
varied  range  of  products,  slower-moving 
products and a  higher service level require 
a  higher profit mark-up to achieve a  given 
return  on  capital  (supply  side  argument), 
and justify a  higher mark-up  due to  more 
service  and  a  greater  dependence  of 
customers  on  the  retailer  (demand  side 
argument). 
-  Stage  in  the  life  cycle  of  the  shop  type: 
during  the penetration  phase  of the  retail 
formula (increasing market  share)  there is 
a  Schumpeterian  bonus  for  successful 
novelty;  during  the  phase  of  saturation 
(constant  market  share)  this  bonus  falls 
away;  during  the phase  of decline (falling 
market  share)  the  profit  mark-up  shrinks 
due  to  the  competition  of novel  types  of 
trade.  The  life  cycle effect has  been  par- 
ticularly  prominent  in  the  grocery  trade, 
with  its  rise  and  decline  of  successive in- 
novations:  self  service,  supermarkets,  dis- 
count  stores,  specialty  supermarkets,  soft 
discounters, a 
Business cycle: the level of the profit mark- 
up  depends  on  the  growth  rate  of  con- 
sumer spending (in volume). The rationale 
is that in a  contracting market, price com- 
petition is more intense, in the struggle for 
a  larger  share  in  a  declining  market  to 
sustain sales volume, which leads to a lower 
average  profit  percentage.  In  Nooteboom 
and Thurik (1985)  allowance was made for 
asymmetry in  the  business  cycle effect:  a 
difference in  effect between recession and 
growth. 
The  mathematical  formula  of  the  margin 
model is given in the appendix. 
5. The ousting of smallness 
The  economy  of  scale  (higher  costs  for 
smaller shops), together with the way in which 
margins  are determined, yields a  mechanism 
by which smaller, independent shops  tend to 
be  systematically pressed  out  of the  market. 
The basic driving force is illustrated in fig. 5. 
Because costs have a  threshold, while per- 
centage margin does not depend on  size,  net 
profit  is  positive  only  beyond  some  critical 
sales  size,  as  already  indicated.  The  penalty 
8  See Nooteboom(1984). B. Nooteboom /  Costs, margins and competition  239 
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Fig. 5.  Increase of scale. 
on small size is negative profits, while beyond 
critical size net profits increase in proportion 
to  sales.  This  tends  to push  up  average sales 
size per shop. 
According  to  the  margin  model,  this  in- 
crease of scale exerts a downward pressure on 
the profit mark-up over costs, so that in fig. 5 
the  gross  profit  line  rotates  downward, 
whereby  critical  size  increases,  which  rein- 
forces the tendency of increasing scale.  Thus 
the  process  of  increasing  scale  feeds  upon 
itself. This process is not explosive, however, 
but  damped:  the  decrease  of  percentage 
margin becomes less and less as average sales 
size increases. Due to the effect of the type of 
product and service level, in the margin model, 
attempts  are  made to  upgrade  the product/ 
service mix with specialty or luxury products 
and better service. 
This  is  the  well-known  phenomenon  of 
'trading  up'.  This  strategy is  risky,  however, 
since  the higher cost  of retailing  that  results 
will  tend  to  evoke  new,  cheaper  types  of 
retailing. This is the well-know concept of the 
'wheel of retailing'. The creation of new forms 
of retailing is  particularly rewarding in  view 
of the life cycle effect:  successful innovation 
is rewarded by an extra profit mark-up. In a 
study of innovation  in  retailing (self service, 
supermarkets,  discount  stores),  Nooteboom 
(1984)  found  that  a  few  independents  were 
the pioneering innovators, but the majority of 
independents were laggards, who adopted the 
innovation much later, to such an extent that 
they were still  entering in  the declining stage 
of  the  life  cycle,  after  large  business  had 
started to move out. Similar evidence is found 
in  Dawson  (1981).  According  to  the  margin 
model, the profit mark-up is squeezed during 
the  phase  of  decline.  As  a  result,  the  late 
entry and  the  lagging  behind  of small  inde- 
pendents also contributes to their decline. 
According  to  the  business  cycle  effect,  a 
switch from growing to stagnant or declining 
consumer  spending yields a  downward pres- 
sure  on  the  profit  mark-up.  This  is  what 
happened  in  the  Netherlands,  for  example, 
when consumer income declined in  the years 
1980-1983.  The  resulting  profit  squeeze, 
yielding a  further downward  rotation  of  the 
profit line in fig.  5, with as a  result a  further 
increase of critical size,  led  to  a  acceleration 
of the decline of small shops. 
This  is  illustrated  in  fig.  6,  which  shows, 240  B. Nooteboom /  Costs, margins and competition 
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Fig. 6. Number  of  shops  in  the  grocery  trade  (logarithmic  scale).  One  unit  of  scale  along  the  vertical  axis  corresponds  to a 10% 
change.  Source:  Nielsen  Food  Index. 
for the Dutch grocery  trade: 
a  decline  in  the  number  of  independent 
shops  which  is  steepest  for  the  smallest 
independents,  and  an increase  in the num- 
ber of shops of multiples. 
an  acceleration  of  the  decline  of  indepen- 
dents  in  1980  (when  consumer  income 
started  to decline).  In 1983-1984  the accel- 
eration  subsided,  and  the  decline  of  shops 
appears  to proceed  at its previous pace. 
It is in line with the margin model that  the 
acceleration  of  the  decline  of  smaller  shops 
fades away. According  to the model,  the  level 
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change  of  spending.  Thus  the  mark-up  is 
reduced when  a  growth  of spending  switches 
to a decline, or when the decline rate increases, 
but  it  remains  the  same  if  the  decline  rate 
subsequently  remains  the  same.  This  is  what 
happend in 1980-1983. After 1980 there is no 
further  downward  pressure  on  margin,  and 
hence no additional  upward pressure on criti- 
cal size. It will take some time for the upward 
shock  of  critical  size  in  1980  to  work  itself 
out,  but after  a  while  a  certain  recovery is  to 
be  expected.  From  1984  onwards,  consumer 
spending  has  again  shown  modest  growth. 
According to the margin model, the transition 
from  declining  to  slightly  growing  expendi- 
ture widens the profit mark-up,  and may thus 
reduce critical  size.  Thus  the  decline  rate  of 
independents  may  temporarily  become  less 
than it was prior to 1980. 
Clearly,  the  decline  of independents,  com- 
bined  with  a  rise  of multiples,  goes  together 
with  a  decline  of market  share  for  indepen- 
dents  and  an  increase  for  multiples.  This  is 
shown in fig. 7. 
Thus it  is  shown  that  during  the  recession 
of  the  early  eighties  the  market  shares  of 
multiples  and  independents  have  diverged 
dramatically.  This  is  ascribed  to  a  rein- 
forcement  of an  existing  trend,  due  to  a  fur- 
ther squeeze of profit margins  as the result of 
a  decline  of  consumer  spending,  which  has 
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independents  due  to  economy of  scale.  Per-  ~r  =  cost of living index with respect 
haps  this  is  not  the  full  explanation.  It  it  to base year to, 
theoretically  plausible  -  and  there  is  em-  Q  =  average  sales  size  per  shop  (at 
pirical  evidence  -  that  there  is  price  dis-  current prices), 
crimination  in  the  sense  of  excessive  dis-  az,a3,a 4  =  coefficients  estimated  (all  are 
counts to large buyers. It is also plausible that  positive), 
in  years  of  stagnant  or  declining  consumer  e  --  income  elasticity  of  the  prod- 
expenditure  the  phenomenon  is  more  pro-  uct/service package  offered, as 
nounced, for two reasons:  a measure of its level of luxury/ 
specialty, 
-  In a time of pressure on consumer prices, it  Wm  =  change  of  market  share  of 
is  more  tempting  for  large  multiples  to  shoptype, 
exert their buying power to the fullest.  ~'  =  percentage  change  of consumer 
-Manufacturers  face  excess  production  spending (in volume), ad 
capacity, which makes  them more  vulner-  U  =  stochastic disturbance term. 
able  to  pressure  to  deliver  to  special 
For the Netherlands the estimates of the coef-  customers at low, marginal costs. 
ficients are as follows: 
Thus price discrimination may also be sub-  b  0 =  7½  thousand  guilders  (base  year  1970), 
ject  to  a  business  cycle effect, and  this  may  which  was  about  equal  to  the  legal 
have contributed to the phenomena of figs. 6  minimum wage of employees, 
and 7.  a 2  =  4.0, 
a 3 =  0.5,  and 
Appendix  a  4 =  0.11. 
Formula of the margin model 
In  mathematical  terms,  the 
follows 
mit =  kit -k-  bo%/Q  + 
scale 
effect ) 
+  a3Wmit  + 
lifecycle ] 
effect  / 
a2eit 
shoptype 





model  is  as 








=  index of shop type, 
=  index of the year, 
=  average  percentage  gross  mar- 
gin, 
=  average  percentage  operating 
costs  (excluding  a  reward  for 
shopkeepers' labour), 
=  average reward for shopkeepers' 
labour in some base year to  (to 
be estimated), 
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